RAKEFET SELA-SHEFFY

CANON FORMATION REVISITED:
CANON AND CULTURAL PRODUCTION

In this paper I propose to discuss what I view as a major aspect in the conception of the role of the canon in regulating culture, namely, the question of how it is related to current cultural production and consumption. I then propose to discuss some aspects of the process of canon formation.

The scope of problematization prevailing in the Anglo-American debate about the canon seems to be too predictable and limited as a conceptual framework for a serious historical research (rather than "critique") into processes of canon formation. Revolving around the question of cultural values, this discourse fails to exceed the limits of the same reductive, normative conception of "high" culture (in the sense of the body of select artifacts), which it basically aspires to challenge. Its commitment to a progressive ideological agenda notwithstanding, this discourse helps reinforcing – rather than revolutionizing – the power of the canon. In the final analysis, this discourse fails to deal with the canon as a general mechanism, indispensable for the organization and evolution of societies.

Regarding the first issue, two problems will be discussed, as follows: (1) *The question of transitoriness*: the fascination with relativism and contingencies of values leads to viewing the canon as entirely negotiable and versatile, far more than it is so in reality. This view underestimates the specific weight of established canons as accumulative, widely shared and persistent cultural reservoirs, which endure the vicissitude of dominant tastes promoted by different groups in different times. As such, the status of the canon is almost irreversibly secured. The formation of the canon is hence a long-term process occurring in addition to the short-term process of shifting trends and legging behind it. (2) *The question of generativeness*: the nexus usually taken for granted between the valorization of artifacts and their recycling in the cultural market is misleading. Canonicity is independent of whether or not the items serve as generative models for current cultural production. Often, the sanctification of items through canonization rituals suspends the availability of these items as active models for interfering with the actual cultural market. Consequently, the canon operates as a stabilizing mechanism (a cultural "sock-absorber") in the ongoing cultural battlefield, and may equally invoked, as a source of legitimation, by all of the participating rival groups.

Regarding the second issue, it is argued that while all cultural practices have "canonical rules"(in the sense of accepted standards), not all have canons in the full sense of a tangible pantheon. The making of such a pantheon depends on the existence of an autonomous field with authorized consecrating agencies. Therefore, in cases of canon formation

Rakefet Sela-Sheffy, Unit for Culture Research, Tel-Aviv University, Gilman, Box 9, Tel-Aviv 69978, Israel. E-mail: rakefet@post.tau.ac.il

in (as yet) "canonless" fields, the canonisers need to be able to act as compatible agents in other, highly canonized fields, so as to borrow models from these field, in order to confer canonicity on the cultural production in their own fields. In all canonizing processes, the *canonisers' strategies* oscillate between the tendency to *consolidate* existing canonized repertoire and that of *prefiguring* a new one and present it as canonical from the outset. Usually, however, the prefiguration of new canonized repertoire comes only late in the process of canon formation, after a prolonged phase of conformity with the existing canon.

I. THE CANON DEBATE: SOME COMMENTS ON THE STATE OF THE ART

For all the cultural impact of the canon debate in recent decades, the theoretical conception of the canon still seems to be rather limited and predictable in terms of the scope of problematization it incites and inadequate as a working hypothesis for research into processes of canon formation. Broadly speaking, this notion seems to revolve around the question of cultural values and who is authorized to determine them. This perspective ideally aspires at opening up the academic discussion of culture (Fiedler 1981) and democratizing its content by focusing on the marginalized and the underprivileged. However, as much as it may be useful for cultural struggles, as a research program it seems to suffer from being both normative and circular. Time and again we end up pointing at the bad guys, who are always those in power who control the canon. And the solution is given in advance, and it is incredibly simplistic: resisting the canon is good. Yet there is a catch here. Since a reverse terror balance has been established in this debate, according to which the monopoly on truth is in the hands of those who present themselves as the delegates of the deprived, powerlessness is now power. Eventually, such a moralistic ideological discourse helps to sustain our political attitudes, yet it sets out to tell us no more than we actually want to hear.

I would like to mention but two ways in which I think the academic discussion of the canon fails to achieve its own goals. First, it seems to fail, against its own claims, to break with the dictum of the so-called intrinsic value of cultural goods allegedly inherited by old-fashioned approaches to culture. To judge by a considerable volume of writing on the canon, this discourse still plays by the same rules of traditional cultural (and especially *literary*) criticism, which is eventually engaged in creating a cultural "legacy." Admittedly, the current discussion of the canon offers awareness of this machinery and promotes the possibility of interfering with it.[1] Yet it never really goes be-

---

[1]   Hence the energy dedicated to revising university curricula or editorial policies of anthologies (see, e.g., Lindenberg 1990; Guillory 1993: 3–84, or Browne and Ambrosetti 1972; Lecker 1995: 113–172; Shumway 1994; and others), all of which fall in line with the dictate of affirmative action. However, even a prominent actor in the canon debate such as Henry Louis Gates finds the zealous belief in the effectiveness of these actions to be over-sanguine:

"Ours was the generation that took over buildings in the late sixties and demanded the creation of black and women's studies programs, and now, like the return of the repressed, has

yond debating the *criteria of valorization*, be they aesthetic or philosophical (see Gorak 1991). It is thus usually still the destinies of individual producers and products, the cultural "highlights", retrospectively reevaluated (for instance, in Levine 1988: 11–82; Tompkins 1985; Guillory 1993: 85–133), or the defense of rising trends (for instance, in Fiedler 1971; Coetzee 1988; Hawkins 1990; Davis and Mirabella 1990), that are at stake here. The bottom line is that this discourse evokes an alternative *content* of the canon, but accepts the elitist ground rules of "valuable cultural goods deserving to be cherished" which underlies conservative cultural criticism. For all the progressive, seemingly more complex, multi-layered and dynamic conception of culture it propagates, in the final analysis the discourse on the canon fails to exceed the limits of the same old reductive conception of official, high Culture which it aspires to challenge. This notion of culture still means, in simple words, nothing more than philosophy, the arts, and, of course, literature.

Secondly, despite its strong declared inclination toward historicism, the current discourse on the canon still seems to be lacking in sound *historical* studies. A "historical perspective" usually means, in this context, "rereading" past documents (mainly literary texts) in order to reveal their ideological biases (and these are usually the same issues dominating today's public discourse – mainly gender and ethnicity – which confine such revivals of historical concern). Most typical are studies into the nationalist agenda in the construction of various national cultures and literatures (e.g., Hohendahl 1989 [1985]; Colls and Dodd 1986; Jusdanis 1991; Lecker 1995; Corse 1997). No doubt, this kind of historicization can be very illuminating in tracing the transformation of meaning and status of cultural goods (Fish 1980), and in unveiling muted voices in this evolution. It also often includes the awareness of the ideological twist caused by the present critics' own cultural biases (see Simpson 1988). However, as sophisticated as it may be, this historicist approach basically offers nothing more than another *interpretation* of the canon. In-depth examination of specific socio-cultural configurations (i.e., the range of cultural options available for specific social groups, which sustain the cohesion of these groups and their rise into power) which were responsible for canonizing certain cultural repertoires in the past are not the order of the day in this discourse.

Of course, I do not mean to deny the role of ideology in organizing social life and sustaining cultural hierarchies. My contention is only that the ways in which culture is maintained and transformed by social groups cannot be reduced to self-conscious ideological agendas alone, because these agendas themselves are subject to complex procedures of repertoire formation, the making of canons included. In many cases we can actually see how ideological sentiments emerge as a *result* of these processes rather than as their initial driving force. For instance, the breakthrough and enormous impact of a subversive youth-culture(s) ideology during the 1960s and 1970s was in

---

come back to challenge the traditional curriculum. And some of us are even attempting to redefine the canon by editing anthologies. Yet it sometimes seems that blacks are doing better in the college curriculum than they are in the streets". (Gates 1992: 19).

many respects the *outcome* of – to no lesser extent than it was the incentive for – the growth and changing status of the popular music industry. Such ideology played a powerful role in legitimizing this process, which involved a resourceful exploitation of available non-canonized black and white repertoires (see, e.g., Rodman 1994; see also Sheffy 1991). By endowing this production with meaning which could appeal to more sophisticated audience than the heterogeneous mass it was addressed to, this ideology eventually facilitated the acceptance of this form of cultural production as a new canonized one by the standards of official culture.

II. THE CANON AND CULTURAL PRODUCTION: A PROPOSAL FOR PROCESS ANALYSIS

The perspective I would like to present here is therefore an attempt to move away from this loop. I propose to discuss the role of the canon as an indispensable cultural mechanism in all social contexts, conflictual and settled alike. I shall begin by challenging today's consensus that canons are entirely versatile in direct response to political wars and changing ideological dictates.[2] More specifically, I would like to address what I view as two major inadequacies in the common conception of the canon, namely, (a) The over-emphasis usually put on canon *change* (see also Lindenberg 1990), which implies a misleading view of the canon as *transitory* by definition; (b) The tendency to confuse the valorization of cultural artifacts with their circulation in the market, which entails the problematic assumption that canons necessarily play a *generative* role in cultural production.

Let me summarize my argument in the following four points:

1. The problem of transitoriness: canonicity vs. cultural dominance

Central to the popular conception of the canon is the conviction that it can always be rejected and displaced. Taken simply to reflect social *hierarchy*, canonicity is believed to be in constant flux and redefinition,[3] in full accordance with unceasing strug-

---

[2]   According to Guillory, the focus and main concern of the canon debate is "the representation or lack of representation of certain social groups in the canon" (Guillory 1990: 5).

[3]   The fascination with relativism and changing cultural hierarchies (as well as the confinement to this perspective) have determined the view of canonicity ever since the Russian Formalism, although with the Post-Structuralist turn the sources of inspiration for dealing with these topics have changed (see, for instance, Herrenstein-Smith's "Contingencies of Values" [1988: 30-53], which is in itself an already canonized reference in this debate). As emerges from key discussions of this matter, the contemporary American literary discourse strikingly fails to make use of the pioneering contribution of the Formalists and Prague Structuralists (notably Jakobson 1962 [1921]; Tynjanov 1969a,b [1924, 1927]; Mukarovsky 1970 [1936]), whose recognition of the relativity and historicity in literature and art pertains to the foundation of modern literary theory at large.

gles between sub-cultures striving for domination. It follows therefore that this view reduces the idea of the canon to no more than a row of fleeting fashions. Yet combats between competing taste-makers are rife in the cultural-market which ceaselessly produces *ad hoc* trends *without necessarily guaranteeing their long lasting value*. For the most part, the winners of these ongoing battles quickly fall into oblivion, whereas canonized items maintain their position as orientation points in the cultural market regardless of its vicissitudes (often surviving even radical revolutions).

In other words, we cannot ignore the fact that there is always a more solid body of artifacts and patterns of action which enjoy larger consensus across society, and which persist for longer periods, even in cases where specific contemporary ideologies tend to reject them. Regardless of the specific historical conditions of its canonization, this canonized repertoire is hardly distinctive of any of the particular rival groups striving for domination in a given social space. It is in fact canonized in the sense that it is *widely shared*, *accumulative*, and *durable*. That is, unlike contemporary prevailing tastes or norms of correctness, this sanctioned repertoire is persistent, or, at least, seems to be much less sensitive to social tensions and transitions which for other cultural segments may result in a total displacement.

For example, the canonization of the novel as the crest of bourgeois literature in late eighteenth century German culture was doubtlessly a very dramatic manifestation of the making of a new cultural canon by the rising German speaking intelligentsia (see Sela-Sheffy 1999). Nevertheless, even this ambitious reshuffling of the canon never caused a total exclusion of formerly existing canonized forms which were endorsed until then by the court society. No doubt, it pertained to the strategy of the novel's canonizers, first and foremost the Early Romantics, to present the novel as the ultimate Modern form of expression and hence the *alternative par excellence* to the so-called classical "old-world" forms (notably the epic). Further, the glorification of the novel as the apex of the contemporary literary practice certainly involved the marginalization, at least to some extent, of the previously prevailing forms. Yet, as a rule, all those canonized literary models and works which constituted the old canon were never really displaced. They continued to be celebrated by the propagators of the modern national (bourgeois) German culture for the last two hundred years, and even if some of them ceased to be practiced (as in the case of the epic), they still remain a most important property of the German legacy until the present day. In the same vein, despite the so-called Modernist revolution in British literature and Eliot's attempt to revise its canon, central Romantic figures still persist as highly canonical assets in the British pantheon (and are apparently even more sanctioned today than in their own time).

In short, *in addition* to a short-term routine of shifting trends, there is a long-term process of accumulation and creation of unshakably sanctioned cultural *reservoirs* by societies, which reservoirs we call canons. Understood in this way, the canon equals the longevity of a culture, or even exceeds it, in cases where violent revolutions or other catastrophes seriously endanger the social structures and civilizations which maintain it (consider the survival of the European Classical, "old world" canon through the French or Russian revolutions in modern times).

A word of reservation is due, however, in case this argument sounds as though it echoes the quasi-traditional notion of the canon usually associated with more formalized realms such as religion or law. For, this latter notion is exactly what is being contested by the modern discourse, and precisely on the ground that it is too rigid and static. Having my focus of interest in cultural *dynamics*, I am certainly not resorting here to a reductive, conservative world-view of "nothing is new under the sun". But I do suggest that cultural processes are not exclusively about *change*, and therefore dealing with it would be deficient unless it accounts for the aspects of accumulation, standardization and institutionalization which govern cultural dynamics to no lesser extent than revolutions do (however less exciting object of study they may seem to be in comparison with the latter!).

The crucial point about canonicity, thus understood, is the sense of *objectification* it confers on such reservoirs, thereby naturalizing them in a given socio-cultural order to the point they seem congenital, *concealing the struggles that determined them* in the first place.[4] The mechanism of objectification, which involves disguising the historical conditions and efforts invested in creating the effect of naturalization, is best elaborated on by Bourdieu (1985, and elsewhere). The power of Bourdieu's analysis lies in that, contrary to that of many cultural critics, it moves away from viewing this mechanism as a "conspiracy" on the part of ruling social sectors, a "plot" allegedly intended to blind the oppressed and incapacitate them. Instead, objectification is seen in his view as a basic cultural mechanism, central to any socio-cultural organization and entirely unavoidable. Since, according to this view, everyone, in whatever social position, is both actively and passively an agent of this mechanism, merely charging certain cultural groups with taking advantage of it is therefore not enough. The fact that not all cultural practices are equally crystallized and enduring, that in different historical points different practices are more available than others for producing canons, and that different groups have different tempo in creating and manipulating their own canonized stocks, all these and other related facts are crucial factors that should be taken into account in the discourse on the canon.

In light of this mechanism of naturalization, the status of the canon as a collective source of authority is different than, say, a best-seller list or *haute couture* (Bourdieu 1980). It functions rather like a safe, into which, once an item is accepted, its value

---

[4]   To take again the example of the Golden Age of German national culture as a paradigm, the failures of certain eminent German writers of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth centuries in their struggles for literary recognition (as in the different cases of Lessing, Hölderlin, or Kleist, to mention just a few); the sectarianism of the Early Romantics' circle, and their complex relations with the intellectual authorities of their time, such as Goethe and Schiller; Goethe's antagonism toward younger rising talents, and his tyranny in the literary field in his lifetime (as described so colorfully by Heine [1833]), or the ups and downs of his posthumous reception by nineteenth century German literary criticism (see Leppmann 1961); – all these and many other facts have no bearing whatsoever on the final composition of the German canon, which equates the idea of German Kultur, as we recognize it today.

is almost irreversibly secured, and it endures the infinite struggles in the name of rival ideologies vying to determine cultural dominance (and equally invoked by all of them).

2. The problem of generativity: cultural status vs. cultural production

In light of the above, two questions arise: (1) what does it take for the fashionable to become canonized, and (2) what is the actual impact of the canon in regulating cultural production and consumption. Let me address the latter question first: Instead of viewing the canon as a force controlling standards of taste and responsible for the circulation of practices, I suggest, to the contrary, that the sanctification conferred upon certain items causes their *suspension* from the market exchange, and hence *frustrates* their use as generative models in actual cultural production.

For the purpose of this argument it is important to make a distinction between the two different implications encapsulated in the very same notion of the canon, namely, between the idea of high *status*, on the one hand, and that of a *guideline for cultural production*, on the other.[5] The latter implication is somehow problematic, since we can think of canonized items which are viewed as such only in the sense that they are largely recognized and valued yet without necessarily serving as active models for generating new cultural products.[6] Such items may not even circulate in the cultural market for long periods of time, except in restricted circles of connoisseurs. Or, they may be present only as great names or "beautiful lines" to be dropped in appropriate occasions by way of "cultured rituals", without a demand on mastering any of the models which generated these items. This is the status of a "Shakespeare", a "Mozart", a "Van Gogh", etc.; there is no argument today about either of them being a canonized brand name, whether or not people like – or even know – their work. As a rule, these items – be they the heroes themselves or their celebrated works – attain a high status which does not coincide with, neither derives directly from current agendas of production and consumption in the different relevant arts. Now, this view certainly does not imply that what people know, use and appreciate is entirely irrelevant to questions of canonicity. This view only implies that there are different modes of cul-

---

5   The complexity of the notion of the canon in its popular use is even greater, as it also involves the distinction between the tangible and the abstract (see also Wienold 1987; Sheffy 1990). This conceptual complexity is implied even by dictionaries which define this term as referring to both (1) a body of worshipped artifacts (most commonly, a set of sacred books – often with a special reference to literature: "the works of an author that have been accepted as authentic" [Random House]); and (2) a rule, decree, a set of prescriptive norms, (even model or standard [Webster's]).

6   The notion of "models" is used in this paper in the sense of implied sets of instructions for generating any number of items (behaviors or products), which people tend to follow most "naturally", either consciously or unconsciously, as competent actors in a given culture, in all areas of life, from the formal public behavior to the unnoticed intimate daily routines (see Even-Zohar 1997, Sheffy 1997).

tural consumption, and that canonized goods are neither immediately dependent on, nor fully compatible with actual consumption and market value.

The distinction between high status and generativity is clearly manifested through collecting institutions: whereas literary periodicals or art galleries tend to act as trendsetters (or at least aspire to act this way) in the field of actual cultural production; anthologies, libraries or museums are more often responsible for sanctioning their collections and suspending them from the cultural market. Within the boundaries of these latter collections the struggle over controlling current production is usually less relevant, as these are compilations of selected items lifted out from different phases in the history of a certain culture, without privileging more recent candidates at the expense of their predecessors. In fact, regarding periods that are considered as Golden Ages, the effect may even be the reverse: in the German literary canon, the great names of Classicism and Romanticism are never overshadowed by any of their descendants. Yet their outstanding status and the ongoing rituals of their preservation do not interfere with current trends in the field of literary production.

As Michael Thompson has argued in his *Rubbish Theory* (Thompson 1979), the denial of use value of objects and their suspension from everyday circulation may involve either the *increase* or *decrease* in their status. Whereas in the latter case these secluded items form repositories which may either be recycled as "second-hand" or be extinct as "trash", in the former case constant efforts are invested in securing their status. It follows that the very act of treasuring is in itself an indicator of high status: a rich man differs form the poor, Thompson argues, not just by the fact that he is able to discard many thing the poor cannot afford to discard, but rather by the fact that the rich is in the position to *treasure* non-value things and so to give them an added value (so that they become "antique" as opposed to "old-fashioned").

However, with respect to current cultural production, the exclusion of such items through canonization may often be accompanied by the *marginalization* of their generative models. Consider, for instance, the decline in status of past narrative models, such as eighteenth-century Adventure and Romantic novels from serious adult literature to stories for children (Shavit 1986) or "housewives" romances respectively, or the application of Romantic Landscape painting to popular decoration, and so on. In such cases, the increase in reproduction of a canonized model, which entails a decline in the preciousness of the replicas, is seen as a deterioration of the supposed "authenticity" of this model (as indicated by the ever growing need to distinguish "real" art from its "cheap fakes"). Yet as a historical model its canonized status remains intact. In fact, in many cases it is observed that the coronation of a certain producer and his artistic model as a canonized generic name comes *after* a decline in the productivity of this model (When the term "Hitchcockean" was established and canonized in the cinematic discourse, Hitchcock's films were already loosing in audience).[7]

My contention therefore would be that the more strongly an item is sanctioned, the lesser its availability as an active model for interfering with contemporary production

---

[7]   I thank Dror Yizhar for this remark.

or consumption. There are well known cases where canonized items are pronounced sacred to the extent that making use of their models is utterly unthinkable. An outstanding example for this is the status of the Scriptures at various historical points.[8] Especially intriguing in this connection are cases where the sanctification of artifacts causes the transformation of their status from abstract into finalized *physical* sacred objects. Again, the case of the Hebrew bible is a notable example, as is "The Book of Splendor" (*Sefer ha Zohar*, see Huss 1998); but so are also various works of art or ethnographical artifacts. Although holy books are rather unique, they still attest to the general principle, namely, that the more an item is idolized through authorized professionals and doctrines, the stronger the chances that access to its generative models will be inhibited.

Thus canonicity distinguishes certain items as *legitimately inconsistent* with current norms of cultural production and consumption. Even most prominent cases when the canon is viewed as a highly active generative force in cultural production, such as that of the Shakespearian canon, are not counter examples here. The popularization of Shakespeare's plays through myriad abbreviations and adaptations (Hawkins 1990; Dobson 1992; Levine 1988; and others), to take a most notable example, is based on interpretations and reinterpretations of certain canonized *products*, but not on recycling their generative models as standard options in the field of literary or theatrical production. Similarly, reproductions of Expressionist paintings may very well hang on the wall in many lower middle-class homes or reprinted on postcards, just like early twentieth-century Modernist "abstract" styles may be popular as interior decoration for upper social strata (Halle 1992). Yet the use of all these models in art production today would not be very successful, to say the least, unless it is carried out by a highly celebrated artist (in which case it will be regarded as a sophisticated allusion, rather than a pathetic misunderstanding of the cultural repertoire). Indeed, it is very unlikely that a beginner, striving at recognition in whatever field of production, would venture to seriously employ any of the canonized models of the past. The presumption of recycling canonized "dead models" in art, fashion, or any other element of lifestyle is a privilege exclusive to those whose position as trendsetters is secured.

---

[8] Rina Drory described the status of the Hebrew Bible in the context of Jewish literature in the 10th century:

It was, apparently, the sacred status conferred upon the Bible by the Rabbinic literature of an earlier period which kept it from the realm of literature, prevented it from being active within it and assigned it to ritual functions only; it was read in public at religious festivals and its phrases illustrated liturgical texts [...], yet it was not the focus of literary interest and was not considered a possible source of literary models. (1988: 162; translation mine).

3. The role of the canon in cultural production:
the canon as a stabilizing mechanism

It follows that viewing the canon either as a sensor of ongoing cultural battles and changing norms of correctness, or as an imposed set of rules controlling cultural production, would both be insufficient. The above proposed problematization of the notion of the canon aims to escape prevailing approaches in cultural studies today, which tend to imagine cultural dynamics as a battleground between two polar forces – the oppressors and the oppressed – and to charge either of these diametric forces with absolute responsibility for either the perpetuation of the canon (equated with social injustice) or its rejection (equated with justified progressive revolutions). What seems to be lacking from this conflicting equation is the sense of continuity and general agreement the canon renders, even in conflicting situations, serving, thus, as *counter-balance to accelerated change*. Such a perspective is offered, on the other hand, by theories hardly acknowledged in cultural studies, whose scope and mode of argumentation is less declaratively committed to social critique of contemporary political agendas.

Among such theoretical sources I find it worthwhile to use the still highly illuminating view of the function of accumulated *reservoirs* in the organization of cultural spaces as elaborated in Jurij Lotman's works on culture (Lotman 1976, 1977 [1974]). Lotman was hardly preoccupied with questions of status and social dominance. He was first and foremost interested in clarifying the levels of "organizedness" in cultural activities. Consequently, he drew a distinction between different cultural strata in terms of what is considered to be indispensable for a "self-description" of a cultural system and what pertains to it only loosely. Since any description is reductive by definition and much more rigid than the complex and fluid phenomena of any cultural practice in reality, for Lotman the "self-description" of a system means a *separate*, more consolidated layer. This layer is constructed within a certain cultural activity, establishing a core of representative components and norms of correctness, to the extent that they may even be formulated as rules. His example is living language: in addition to the various strata in which utterances are normally generated (standard, written, vernacular, slang, etc.), there also exists a *grammar* in the traditional sense of the word, namely – an official normative description of the language which in effect has very little to do with the way people speak and understand their language, yet which is viewed by both the establishment and popular doxa as "the thing itself" and serves as both its natural example and censor.

Such an argument is helpful in addressing the question regarding the function of more solid stocks of canonized repertoires in regulating cultural production and consumption. Viewed in this way, canonized items would be better conceptualized as *exemplars* (see Sheffy 1997). I use the term *exemplar* to indicate a distinction between two senses of cultural modelling, namely, between the idea of *replica* on the one hand, and that of *icon* on the other. While the former ideally refer to an abstract scheme equally repeated in any number of concrete copies, in the latter case the model consist of a certain exemplary item serving as a source for imitation, without rendering a consistent scheme to be fully realized in all its manifestations.

Typically, the popular metaphor for the former kind of modeling will be that of industrial production (such as cars, shoes, etc.), where infinite amount of copies can be equally rendered by the same sketch, without distinguishing any particular copy as a standard to be imitated by all the others. Clearly, in no field of human action can perfect manifestations of this mechanism be observed. However, the tendency to tolerate this idea of modelling in culture is in an inverse ratio to the status of the material discussed: The more the field of study is viewed as "popular", the greater the tendency to allow the notion of "models" in the sense of perpetuated schemes. In these fields, "production" is biased as supposedly devoid of "individuality", "innovation" or "richness", which according to people's prejudices is characteristic of exclusive cultural provinces only, especially literature and the arts. Considering the total production in these latter fields, however, it seems to be regulated by the same modelling mechanism observed in the other fields.

By contrast, the notion of exemplar implies a rather loose mode of modelling, with *non-egalitarian* relations between the highly valued source item and its imitations, and without any repetitive scheme equally governing all imitations. Hence, the result products relate to their exemplars only by way of aspired resemblance. In this way, for instance, Petrarch's life is known to have been established as a model for the image of the modern intellectual (or "poet") ever since the Renaissance (Gaeta 1982: 198, Kernan 1979). Another example would be the case of George "Beau" Brummell who is known to have served as model for Dandy life throughout the nineteenth century (Smith 1974). Interestingly, while Brummell initiated this lifestyle and served as its source of inspiration, the most acclaimed icons of Dandism today are later canonized incarnations of this model, such as the figures of Lord Byron or Oscar Wilde. The reason for the foregrounding of these latter figures seems to be that, as agents performing in the *literary* field, they have been subject to a more potent process of canonization than Brummell (and I will return to this subject below).

As suggested above, a closer look at cases where it is claimed that past canonized items have been reactivated for innovations in the field of production will reveal that it is not so much the particularities of their generative models as their *outlines*, or *labels*, extrapolated from specific items, that are usually adopted. This principle is revealed, for instance, in the use of Biblical Hebrew in the revival of Modern Hebrew during the late eighteenth century; in the evocation of Shakespeare as the epitome of a so-called "natural poetry" in the formation of German Romantic literature; or in less dramatic cultural transformations, such as the so-called revival of the popular music and fashion of the 1960's and 1970's in the "retro" style of the 1990's. In all such cases, the prestige of certain glorified exemplars has been conferred upon other active models, so as to allow the circulation, and guarantee the value of new generative options (a spoken language, a mode of literary writing, a new look or a new sound). Viewed in this way, canonized reservoirs serve as means of *legitimating revolutions*, operating as a shock-absorber, or a solid index, so to speak, vis-à-vis the ups and downs of the cultural stock-exchange.

4. Strategies of canonization: consolidation and prefiguration

Finally, it is essential to note that while changing trends resulting from market struggles is universal in all fields of production, the making of a canon is not self-evident. Not all cultural activities equally develop canons in the full sense of an explicit, tangible pantheon of selected exemplars. The existence of a canon in this sense seems to be an obvious matter in the realm of religion, law, or in the arts. Yet it would seem much less evident when we think, for instance, about gesticulation, diet, manners, or even fashion (costume) and advertisement, let alone many other practices some of which are hardly recognized as defined social activities. Not that all of these practices are not stratified, with their own dominant and marginal repertoires. Further, all practices develop a more solid core of persistent rudimentary models which serve as prototypical bases for people's orientation. In his cognitive theory of representation Chris Sinha introduces the idea of "canonical rules" (Sinha 1988).[9] Sinha uses this notion to refer to the cognitive categories which regulate linguistic behavior, providing "the fundamental basis for the intelligibility of social behaviour both within and across linguistic communities" (Sinha 1988: 38). Evidently, such "canonical rules" may apply to whatever practices, other than linguistic. The difference seems to be, however, that unlike religion or the arts, the practices mentions above do not (as yet) constitute entirely autonomous fields of action, with authorized consecrating agencies dedicated to explicitly codifying and securing the sanctification of their products as indispensable cultural goods, and as epitomes of the group's values and world views. At least these agencies are not extant to the same measure as in the realms of religion or the arts.[10] Canonicity therfore holds more than just a hierarchical index, in that it distinguishes well recognized fields in which specific pantheons are actively constructed and defended by specific interested parties, from practices which have not (yet) evolved in this way.

   In the light of this distinction, the making of canons for non-canonized set of practices – i.e., the construction of a pantheon which has never been before – would deserve a special analysis. Clearly, it must be the interest of a specific group of people to form, or to reform, a canon (that is, to capitalize on the consecration of a certain reper-

[9] I tend, however, to dispute Sinha's assumption (which is shared by other theories of prototype) that canonical rules derive from constraints of natural functions (say, that cutting determines the canonical representation of a knife, etc.) The canonical representation of a house, as emerges from children's paintings, to take a notable example, includes a red tilted roof which most often has nothing to do with functional features of real houses.

[10] It may be argued that the difference lies in the fact that some of these practices have no finalized products which can be compiled and consecrated (this idea has been suggested already by Jakobson and Bogatyrev in their discussion of Folk Art; Jakobson and Bogatyrev 1982 [1929]). Yet this technical explanation is rather shaky. After all, we do have books on manners or cooking which, technically, can serve the same purpose of objectifying these practices exactly as books on law and religion do. In any event, this argument is entirely inapplicable to the other practices mentioned above, such as fashion or advertisement, which may be viewed as semi-canonized.

toire and the creation of a distinctive field of activity). However, it takes more than just the motivation of the canonizers who seem to profit from it. The question is what canonizers do, and how they do it. As various studies have shown, the work of canonization includes the construction of a particular *theory* and a *history* of the field (see, for instance, Hohendahl's analysis of the formation of the canonical German literary history during the nineteenth century, Hohendahl 1989; or Shenhav's discussion of the fabrication of Organization Theory as means of canonization in the field of engineering, Shenhav 1995), as well as establishing certain rituals, such as celebrating events or pilgrimage, and so on. All these sustain the formation of solid stocks of models and their consecration as indispensable assets of the relevant fields.

In each particular case, however, the canonizers' strategies oscillate between two conflicting tendencies. The one is that of *consolidating* and sanctioning an existing repertoire (sometimes marking a phase of socio-cultural stagnation), and the other is that of *prefiguring* a new repertoire and sanctioning it from the outset (usually indicating a deliberate ambition at revolutionizing a given field). In the first case, the canonizers' work is presented as the ultimate realization of the accumulated canon, while in the latter case it is presented as the formation of a brand new canon. Even then, however, formerly accumulated canonized repertoires are not necessarily discarded.

The chances that one strategy or the other will predominate depend on the position the agents applying them occupy in the particular cultural field. According to Bourdieu, the greater the accumulated capital of certain agents in a specific field, the stronger their interest in buttressing existing repertoires, and vice versa (Bourdieu 1980a). Unlike Bourdieu, however, I do not see such a symmetrical relation between positions and strategies. Often orthodoxy is precisely the strategy of those in the periphery, whose aspiration to participate force them to demonstrate maximal knowledge of and compliance with the canonical (however outdated) repertoire. On the other hand, innovations may often be the privilege of senior capital-holders as the only means of sustaining their established authority to set the rules of the game in a given field.

Evidently, the tendency to consolidate and sanction existing repertoires is most typically observed in cultural fields of extremely rigid social equilibrium and maximal codification. A perfect example of this strategy is offered by Norbert Elias in his analysis of the crystallization of European court culture which he views as the prototype of Western culture at large (Elias 1978). As Elias shows, in this case, the canonizers' work consists in meticulous explicitation of the obligatory models of certain practices, extracted from "precedents" of normative conduct, and assign them the status of absolute rules.[11] As emerges from his analysis, this strategy applies to all areas of life, including those practices in which a certain stagnant repertoire persists

---

[11] According to Elias, the greater the volume and complexity of the net of inter-dependencies between individuals in a given social space, the more total the stagnation of cultural models and their imposition on individual actions. Hence, the French Court Society serves him as paradigm:

without culminating into a full-fledged pantheon of exemplars. The collection of examples from guides on etiquette and manners, involving a period of several centuries, through which Elias illustrates his notion of *The Civilizing Process* (1978 [1939]), demonstrates the inertial power of such a sweeping canonizing strategy. For instance, Elias concludes that

> At the end of the eighteenth century, [...] the French upper class attained approximately the standard of eating manners, and certainly not only of eating manners, that was gradually to be taken for granted in the whole of civilized society. [...] If this series were continued up to the present day, further changes of detail would be seen: new imperatives are added, old one are relaxed; [...] but the essential basis of what is required and what is forbidden in civilized society – the standard eating technique, the manner of using knife, fork, spoon, plate, serviette, and other eating utensils – these remain in their essential feature unchanged. Even the development of technology in all areas – even that of cooking – [...] has left the techniques of eating and other forms of behavior essentially unchanged. (Elias 1978: 104–105).[12]

It may justifiably be argued that consolidation is the more common strategy of canonization, applying even to cultural spaces of rather loose social equilibrium, which are more susceptible to rapid cultural changes (or what Bourdieu call "partial revolutions" which occur all the time, as the agents supporting them have more to lose than to gain from a total rejection of existing sanctioned repertoires; Bourdieu 1980a). Hence, even what appears to be an unprecedented "innovation" is only a "remodeling," namely, an imposition of existing canonical categories on products that until that point were not labelled as such, while the ultimate effect is eventually still that of securing the perpetuation of the existing canon. Still, this strategy also allows the *expansion* of the canon by adding new items into the sanctioned inventory. A typical manifestation of such routine is the evocation of "authenticity" as means of legitimation, through affiliating the new candidate to past exemplars.

> "[...] etiquette and ceremony increasingly became [...] a ghostly perpetuum mobile that continued to operate regardless of any direct use-value, being impelled, as by an inexhaustible motor, by the competition for status and power of the people enmeshed in it [...] In the last analysis this compelling struggle for ever-threatened power and prestige was the dominant factor that condemned all those involved to enact these burdensome ceremonies. No single person within the figuration was able to initiate a reform of the tradition. Every slightest attempt to reform, to change the precarious structure of tension, inevitably entailed an upheaval [...] So everything remained as it was." (Elias 1983 [1969]: 86–87).

[12] Note that although Elias's intention in his analysis is to account for actual everyday gastronomic and culinary practices, and not for "the canon", what he in fact shows is the persistent stock of unshakable prototypical categories, which seem to be closer to "eating grammer" in Lotman's sense, rather than to what people actually do. For, although fork and knife constitute in our cultural consciousness indispensable components, which fall in line with Sinha's idea of canonical representations of "civilized eating", in practice these eating rules are not always observed. In fact, we definitely have – and tolerate! – many other eating routines which are not formalized and not acknowledged by books on manners, like eating with the hands, eating sandwiches, "McDonald's eating", etc.

However, it is the prefiguration of a new repertoire that entails a more dramatic effect of canon formation, usually associated more overtly with social clash and with the victory of one ideology over another. By "prefiguring" I mean the act of envisioning a new desired set of rules for cultural production, which has very little to do with the actual production at a given historical moment in a given cultural space, yet which becomes tremendously effective in transforming this space. Under certain circumstances, such an imaginary repertoire, presented as a *program* for future production and consumption, may be accepted as a real cultural fact, despite its virtual existence.

The extent to which this strategy is successful depends on the specific circumstances of the work of canonization. For instance, in the case of the the invention of modern German national culture, Early Romantic novel became an extremely useful tool, despite the fact that it existed more in theory than in practice. Its extreme obscurity and detachment from the literary production of the time (it was only sporadically exemplified in experimental literature which was propagated by a closed, eccentric literary circle), all this attests to the fact that it was hardly proposed as a generative model to be immediately adopted by the contemporary literary writers (Sheffy 1999a; see also Behler 1978). Nevertheless as a visionary model, the German Romantic Novel was highly functional in transforming the field of German literature, which was the locus of the inception of the German *Kultur*, and in setting its standards. It was accepted from the beginning as a canonized model, and eventually persisted far beyond its own time as an epitome of the modern conception of literature at large.

The two opposing strategies do not exclude each other, but rather often mark two different phases of the same canonizing process. Yet seemingly contrary to what might be expected, the act of prefiguring a new repertoire does not indicate an initial phase in the process of canon formation. Rather, from the cases I studied it emerges that this strategy is only ripe at later stages, after new producing agencies have already gained recognition through affiliating themselves with old canonized doctrines. Only then their mandate is acknowledged to fabricate a new repertoire that would be recognized as a legitimate prognosis for further cultural production (instead of being rejected as merely a form of cultural aberration).

In other words, the prefiguration of a new canonized repertoire is usually preconditioned by a prolonged – if less conspicuous – process where conformity with an existing canon prevailed. The late eighteenth century Romantic vision of prose-fiction as the crest of literary forms would not have been possibly conceived of, let alone legitimized at the time, unless preceded by massive attempts for several decades to establish a criticism of the novel in terms of Classicist doctrines (for instance, as "epic without verse"; see Sheffy 1999a). Not before the inception of that programmatic phase by the Early Romantics, however, was the German novel seriously acknowledged as a canonized form, becoming such a significant tool in the creation of the modern German canon.

Not always does the process of canon formation culminates in such a dramatic phase of prefiguring an ultimate canon, as in the case of late eighteen-century prose-fiction industry (which was the main channel of constructing the modern German national canon at large). Yet a very similar shift of strategies is rather typical in

many other cases of canon formation in fields which did not previously have distinctive pantheons of their own. One such case, to take another example, was the modern American popular song during the 1970's. An inevitable phase in the canonization of American Rock'n'Roll lyrics was the intensive application of literary textual models borrowed from a higher ranked canonized field such as Modernist poetry. This is attested most notably by the writing of Bob Dylan. Through manifesting overt conformity with canonical (however outdated) *literary* repertoire, Dylan's lyrics was recognized by *literary* consecration agencies such as critics and editors (see, e.g., Carroll 1968; Davey 1976; Gray 1981). In this way canonicity was conferred on his work. And this fact was a precondition for his later denial of his affiliation with established canonical poetry and claim for autonomous legitimate status as a "song writer" (see Sheffy 1991). But even this claim for canonization of a brand new, revolutionary standard of cultural production was not possible without the advocacy of a highly canonized *poetry* "producer", such as Allen Ginsberg, who declared fascination with, and utilization of Dylan's "song-writing" poetics (Ginsberg 1975). Only then could an autonomous pantheon of Rock'n'Roll lyrics begin to be constructed (with Dylan himself already acting as consecrating agency).

In both these mentioned cases, as in many others, the consecration process depended on a successful utilization of existing canonical repertoires, sometimes available only from the pantheons of other fields of activity. Therefore, there is usually a gap – both in time and content – between the fabrication of new repertoires and the point at which full sanctification can be guaranteed to them, as the result of which they become new canons in the full sense of the word. Consequently, a study of canon formation should account for the delicate balance between orthodoxy and heresy in the canonizers' use of previously existing canons. Depending on their starting position, the canonizers either rely on traditional agencies of authority or venture to present themselves as the inventors of the wheel. Accordingly, their action is governed by either the tendency to evoke long established canonical repertoires as sources for legitimation and prestige, or by that of rejecting these repertoires in their aspiration to establish their own sources of legitimation.

Careful examination is required of the use of the past in the work of canonization, since the evocation of past cultural assets does not always mean consolidation of existing canons. Often, this act can serve, more sophisticatedly, as means of revolutionizing a given field and constructing a new canon, by claiming to have a hold, in the name of "authenticity", of a most genuine version and ultimate interpretation of an old canonical reservoir. This is illustrated by all Modern age cases of "revivalism", such as the so-called revival of Medieval tradition by the Romantic turn in the making of national German culture (see, e.g., Robson-Scott 1965); the "return" to renaissance Italian or to ancient Hebrew, and the making of Landsmaal in Norway, during the nineteenth century (Haugen 1966); or the "return" to Scots in the early twentieth; as well as many other cases of resorting to "dead" languages and traditions by national movements. And the same principle is recurrent in legitimizing new trends of cultural production on a smaller scale. As Bourdieu argues (1980a), in times where the pursuit of "originality" becomes the name of the game, it is often precisely an apparent con-

servatism that seems to be a more effective stance, which nevertheless amounts to the same strategy of transforming the cultural agenda by prefiguring a new canon and profoundly challenging the balance in a given socio-cultural space.

REFERENCES

Behler, Diana. 1978. *The Theory of the Novel in Early German Romanticism. Utah studies in literature and linguistics,* Vol. 11. Berne: Lang.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1980. "Haute couture et haute culture." In *Questions de sociologie,* Paris: Edition de Minuit, 196–206.

—. 1980a "Quelques propriétés des champs". In *Questions de sociologie*, Paris: Edition de Minuit, 113–120.

—. 1984 [1979]. "The Economy of Practices". *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste.* Trans. Richard Nice. London & New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 97–256.

—. 1985. "The Market of Symbolic Goods." *Poetics* 14: 13–44.

Browne, Ray B. and Roland J. Ambrosetti, eds. 1972. *Popular Culture and Curricula.* Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green University Popular Press.

Carroll, Paul (ed.). 1968. *The Young American Poets*. Introd. by James Dickey. New York: Follett.

Coetzee, J. M. 1988. *White Writing. On the Culture of Letters in South Africa.* New Haven and London: Radix, and Yale University Press.

Colls, Robert and Philip Dodd. 1987. *Englishness. Politics and Culture 1880–1920.* London, New York, and Sydney: Croom Helm.

Corse, Sarah M. 1997. *Nationalism and Literature. The Politics of Culture in Canada and the United States.* Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.

Davis, Lennard J., and M. Bella Mirabella, eds. 1990. *Left Politics and the Literary Profession.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Davey, F. 1976. "Leonard Cohen and Bob Dylan: Poetry and the Popular Song". In Gnarowski, M. ed., *Leonard Cohen, The Artist and His Critics*, Toronto: McGraw Hill, 111–124.

Dobson, Michael. 1992. *The Making of the National Poet*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Drory, Rina. 1988. *The Emergence of Jewish-Arab Contacts at the Beginning of the 10th Century (Hebrew).* Tel-Aviv: Porter Institute & HaKibbutz HaMeuxad.

Elias, Norbert. 1978 [1939]. *The Civilizing Process.* Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Vol. 1. *The History of Manners.* New York: Pantheon.

—. 1983 [1969]. *The Court Society.* Trans Edmund Jephcott. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Fiedler, Leslie A. 1971. "The Children's Hour, or the Return of the Vanishing Longfellow; Some Reflections of the Future of Poetry." In *Liberation; New Essays of the Humanities in Revolution,* Ed. I. Hassan, Conn. Middletown 149–75.

—. 1981. "Literature as an Institution: The View from 1980." In Leslie A. Fiedler and Houston A. Jr. Baker. eds. *English Literature. Opening up the Canon,* 73–91.

Even-Zohar 1997. "Factors and Dependencies in Culture: A Revised Draft for Polysystem Culture Research." *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature* 24 (1): 15–34.

Fish, Stanley. 1980. *Is There a Text in This Class?* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Gaeta, Franco. 1982. "Dal comune ala corte rinascimentale". In *Letteratura Italiana: Il letterato e le istituzioni*, ed. Roberto Asor Rosa. Torino: Einaudi, 149–255.

Gates, Henry Louis Jr. 1992. *Loose Canons. Notes on the Culture Wars*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ginsberg, Allen. 1975. *First Blues*. New York: Full Court Press.

Gorak, Jan. 1991. *The Making of the Modern Canon. Genesis and Crisis of a Literary Idea.* London: Athlone.

Gray, M. 1981 (1972). *The Art of Bob Dylan*. London: Hamlyn.

Guillory, John. 1993. *Cultural Capital*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Halle, David. 1992. "The Audience for Abstract Art: Class, Culture, and Power". In Michele Lamont and Marcel Fornier. eds. *Cultivating Difference. Symbolic Boundaries and the Making of Inequality*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 131–151.

Haugen, Einar. 1996. *Language Conflict and Language Planning: The Case of Modern Norwegian*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Hawkins, Harriet. 1990. "From 'King Lear' to 'King Kong' and Back: Shakespeare and Popular Modern Genres". In *Classics and Trash. Tradition and Taboos in High Literature and Popular Modern Genres.* New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 103–138.

Heine, Heinrich. (1833*). The Romantic School*. Ed. Eliss Haverlock. London: Walter Scott Publishing Co.

Hernnstein-Smith, Barbara. 1988. *Contingencies of Values: Alternative Perspective for Critical Theory.* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Hohendahl, Peter Uwe. 1989 [1985]. *Building a National Literature. The Case of Germany 1830–1870*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Huss, Boaz. 1998*. "Sefer ha Zohar* as a Canonical, Sacred and Holy Text: Changing Perspectives of the Book of Splendor between the Thirteenth and Eighteenth Centuries". *The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy* 7: 275–307.

Kernan, Alvin B. 1979. "The Poet's Place in the World. Images of the Poet in the Renaissance". In *The Playwrite as Magician*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1–23.

Jakobson, Roman. 1962 (1921). "On Realism in the Arts". In *Reading in Russian Poetics*, ed. Ladislav Matejka (Ann Arbor): 29–36.

Jakobson, Roman and Petr Bogatyrev. 1982 (1929). "Folklore as a Special Form of Creativity". In *The Prague School. Selected Writings, 1929–1946*, ed. Peter Steiner. Texas University Press, 32–46.

Jusdanis, Gregory. 1991. *Belated Modernity and Aesthetic Culture. Inventing National Literature. Theory and History of Literature,* Vol. 81. Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press.

Lecker, Robert. 1995. *Making it Real: The Canonization of English-Canadian Literature.* Concord, Ontario: Anansi.

Levine, Lawrence W. 1988. *Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Lindenberg, Herbert. 1990. "The Normality of Canon Change." In *The History in Literature: On Value, Genre, Institutions*. New York: Columbia University Press, 131–147.

Lotman, Jurij. 1976. "Culture and Information." *Dispositio* 1 (3): 13–15.

—. 1977 <1974>. "The Dynamic Model of Semiotic System." *Semiotica* (3–4):193–210.

Mukařovský, Jan. 1970 [1936]. *Aestetic Function, Norm and Value as Social Facts* (transl. by Mark E. Suino). Ann Arbor: Michigan Press.

Robson-Scott, William Douglas. 1965*. The Literary Background of the Gothic Revival in Germany: A Chapter in the History of Taste.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Rodman, Gilbert B. 1994. "A Hero to Most? Elvis, Myth, and the Politics of Race". *Cultural Studies* 8 (3): 457–483.

Sela-Sheffy, Rakefet. 1999. *Literarische Dynamik und Kulturbildung: Zur Konstruktion des Repertoires deutscher Literatur im ausgehenden 18. Jahrhunderts*. Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag.

—. 1999a. "Estrategias de canonización y el campo intelectual en la cultura alemana del siglo dieciocho". In: *Teoría de los polisistemas*. Ed. M. Iglesias. Madrid: ARCO Libros, 125–146.

Shavit, Zohar. 1986. *Poetics of Children's Literature*. Atlanta: The University of Georgia Press.

Sheffy, Rakefet. 1990. "The Concept of Canonicity in the Polysystem Theory." *Poetics Today* 11 (3): 511–522.

—. 1991. "Canonization of a Non-literary System: The Case of the Modern American Popular Song and its Contact with Poetry." In *Oral/written,* 177–185.

—. 1997. "Models and Habituses: Problems in the Idea of Cultural Repertoires." *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature* 24 (1): 35–47.

Shenhav, Yehuda. 1995. "From Chaos to Systems: The Engineering Foundation of Organization Theory, 1879–1932". *Administrative Science Quarterly* 40: 557–585.

Shumway, David. 1994. *Creating American Civilization. A Genealogy of American literature as an Academic Discipline*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.

Simpson, David. 1988. "Literary Criticism and the Return to 'history'" *Critical Inquiry* 14 (4): 721–47.

Sinha, Chris. 1988. *Language and Representation*. New York: New York University Press.

Smith, Thomas Spence. 1974. "Aestheticism and Social Structure: Style and Social Network in the Dandy Life". *American Sociological Review* 39 (5): 725–743.

Thompson, Michael. 1979. *Rubbish Theory: The Creation and Destruction of Value.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tompkins, Jane. P. 1985. *Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction, 1790–1860.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Tynjanov, Jurij. 1969a [1924]. "Das literarische Factum." In *Texte der Russische Formalisten,* Ed Jurij Striedter. München: Fink, Vol. 1, 393–431.

—. 1969b [1927]. "Über die literarische Evolution." In *Texte der Russische Formalisten,* Ed Jurij Striedter, München: Fink, Vol. 1, 332–361.

Wienold, Götz. 1987. "Kanon und Hierarchiebildung in Sprache und Literatur: Sprachentwicklungstyp, Diglossie und Polysystem." In *Kanon und Zensur: Archäologie der literarische Kommunikation* II, eds. Aleida Assmann & Jan Assmann. München: Fink, 300–308.